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Apprendi after Miller and Graham
HOW THE SUPREME COURT’S RECENT
JURISPRUDENCE ON JUVENILES PROHIBITS THE
USE OF JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS AS
MANDATORY “SENTENCING ENHANCEMENTS”
INTRODUCTION
On December 12, 2011, in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, Cory Devon
Washington was sentenced after pleading guilty to two counts
of firearm possession—felon in possession of a firearm and
possession of an unregistered firearm.1 Under ordinary
circumstances, Washington would have faced a maximum of 10
years incarceration for such offenses.2 Washington, however,
was sentenced to a minimum of 15 years after the sentencing
judge applied the requirements of the Armed Career Criminal
Act (ACCA).
The ACCA is a federal law that sets mandatory
minimum sentences of incarceration for crimes involving a
firearm when the defendant has three prior convictions for a
“violent felony” or “serious drug offense.”3 Washington had
three prior involvements with the justice system, including two
convictions as an adult—one for assault and battery and
another for burglary—and a juvenile adjudication for pointing
a weapon that was dismissed after Washington completed a
five-month probationary sentence.4 Not only had the juvenile
offense been dismissed, it had occurred when Washington was
16 years old, nearly 20 years prior.5 But the sentencing judge
1 Brief of Defendant/Appellant at 5, United States v. Washington, 706 F.3d
1215 (10th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-6339), 2012 WL 1074455 at *5.
2 Id. at 11.
3 See 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)(1) (2012).
4 United States v. Washington, 706 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2012).
5 Id. An additional argument made by the defendant in the Washington case
was that the defendant’s juvenile adjudication should not be considered a conviction
under the ACCA not only because it was a juvenile offense but also because it was
actually dismissed after a period of probation See id. at 1218-19. The court did not find
this argument convincing because Oklahoma state law does not automatically seal
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determined that Washington’s juvenile offense of pointing a
gun counted as a conviction for a violent felony under the
ACCA, meaning that Washington had three prior convictions
for violent felonies.6 Under the mandatory requirements of the
ACCA, the court sentenced Washington to a minimum term of
imprisonment of 15 years.7
Washington’s case is only one of the stories in the
ongoing question of how to treat prior juvenile adjudications
when sentencing adult defendants who have violated federal or
state laws. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court
held that due process does not require the right to a jury trial
in juvenile delinquency adjudications.8 In 2000, the Court held
in Apprendi v. New Jersey that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”9 Failure to
submit and prove such facts to a jury constitutes a violation of the
defendant’s right to due process.10 The exclusion of convictions
from this requirement has been commonly referred to as a
“conviction exception” or the “Apprendi exception.”11 The intercept
between Apprendi and McKeiver has resulted in disagreement
over whether juvenile adjudications obtained without a jury trial
guarantee can be counted as convictions, subject to the Apprendi
exception, for the sentencing of adult defendants without running
afoul of due process and violating the defendant’s rights under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

juvenile dismissals and because these cases are still relevant under state law for future
sentencing purposes. Id. Therefore, the court reasoned such dismissals are also
relevant under the ACCA. Id. This secondary argument presents an additional set of
legal analysis that will not be dealt with at any length in this note.
6 Id. at 1217.
7 Id.
8 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 at 545-50 (1971).
9 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (emphasis added).
10 Id.
11 See e.g., Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 426-27 (7th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 3019 (2011); United States v. Wright, 594 F.3d 259, 262-64 (4th Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 507 (2010); United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25, 34
(1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1238 (2008); United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d
744, 749 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1105 (2008); Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d
1139, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 933 (2007); United States v. Burge
407 F.3d 1183, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 981 (2005); United
States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 694-96 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 (2004);
United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1032 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
1114 (2003); United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 2001).
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A significant number of circuit courts have held that a
juvenile adjudication counts as a conviction.12 Many in the
scholarly community, however, have argued that juvenile
adjudications should not count as previous convictions because
of the absence of a jury trial guarantee.13 Thus, any sentencing
scheme where the judge imposes a mandatory or enhanced
sentence based on the adult defendant’s prior juvenile record,
without submitting and proving this fact to the jury, is a
violation of due process. This note will argue that a juvenile
adjudication should not count as a conviction under the
Apprendi exception: that based on the factual underpinnings of
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on the nature of juveniles
in Miller v. Alabama and Graham v. Florida, the Court should
conclude that the purpose of the juvenile court system prohibits
courts from counting a juvenile delinquency adjudication as a
“conviction” when sentencing adult defendants. Therefore, any
sentencing scheme under which the judge imposes a mandatory
or enhanced sentence based on the adult defendant’s prior
juvenile record is a violation of due process.
Part I will introduce Supreme Court jurisprudence on the
evolution of the juvenile court system and the extension of some
procedural protections to juvenile delinquency proceedings. Part
II will explain Apprendi v. New Jersey and the Court’s
recognition of a “conviction exception.” Part III will discuss how
federal courts have treated juvenile adjudications in light of the
Apprendi exception. Part IV will discuss recent Supreme Court
cases dealing with juveniles as a class distinguishable from
adults, specifically the most recent cases of Miller v. Alabama
and Graham v. Florida. Finally, in Part V, this note will
address how Miller v. Alabama and Graham v. Florida reflect a
change in the Court’s perception of juveniles. It advances the
12 See e.g., Welch, 604 F.3d at 428-29; Wright, 594 F.3d at 264; Matthews, 498
F.3d at 35; Crowell, 493 F.3d at 750; Burge 407 F.3d at 1191; Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 696;
Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033.
13 See Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and
McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality
of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111 (2003); Jason Abbott, Note,
The Use of Juvenile Adjudications Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 85 B.U. L.
REV, 263 (2005); Douglas M. Schneider, Note, But I Was Just a Kid!: Does Using
Juvenile Adjudications to Enhance Adult Sentences Run Afoul of Apprendi v. New
Jersey?, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 837 (2005); Brian P. Thill, Comment, Prior “Convictions”
Under Apprendi: Why Juvenile Adjudications May Not Be Used to Increase an
Offender’s Sentence Exposure If They Have Not First Been Proven to a Jury Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 573 (2004). But see Daniel Kennedy, Note,
Nonjury Juvenile Adjudications as Prior Convictions Under Apprendi, 2004 U. ILL. L.
REV. 267, Part IV & V (2004) (arguing that juvenile adjudications should fall under the
conviction exception as they are reliable).
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argument that, regardless of whether a juvenile adjudication
was obtained by a jury, the Court’s view of juveniles as a class
fundamentally distinct from adults prohibits equating juvenile
adjudications with adult convictions under Apprendi.
I.

SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON THE JUVENILE
SYSTEM

In the 1800s, Progressive Reformers pushed to create
institutions and enact laws that would shape and mold the
development of children.14
The legal doctrine of parens patriae—the right and responsibility of
the state to substitute its own control over children for that of the
natural parents when the latter appeared unable or unwilling to
meet their responsibilities or when the child posed a problem for the
community—provided the formal justification to intervene.15

The root of the juvenile justice system as a method of
combating delinquency stems from “positivist ideology” and the
notion of a “rehabilitative ideal,” requiring an individualized
approach to each child and deference to professional opinions.16
Progressive reformers imagined a court system where
“professionals made discretionary, individualized treatment
decisions to achieve benevolent goals and social uplift and
substituted a scientific and preventive approach for the
traditional punitive goals of the criminal law.”17 Adopting this
flexible approach, and in an effort to avoid the stigmatization
associated with the adult criminal system, reformers classified
the juvenile court as a civil system where “petitions” were filed
(as opposed to charges brought), “[c]ourts found youths to be
‘delinquent’ rather than guilty of an offense, and youths
received ‘dispositions’ rather than sentences.”18
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court, however, concerned
about the degree of power and discretion wielded by the State,
stepped in to extend Constitutional protections to youths in the
juvenile system. In 1967, the Supreme Court decided In re
Gault, holding that while the juvenile system was different
from the adult criminal system, the possibility of serious
consequences such as confinement and loss of liberty required
14 BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
JUVENILE COURT 34-45 (1999).
15 Id. at 52.
16 Id. at 60.
17 Id. at 62.
18 Id. at 68.
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the imposition of procedural protections including the right to
notice of charges, the right to counsel, the right to crossexamine and confront witnesses, and the privilege against selfincrimination.19 The facts of Gault vividly illustrated the
potential for abuse given the wide discretion exercised in the
juvenile court system. The defendant, Gerald Gault, was
committed to custody for six years for making an obscene phone
call, whereas an adult who committed the same offense would
have faced a maximum punishment of a 50 dollar fine.20
While the purported purpose of the juvenile court
system is to rehabilitate juveniles, the Court recognized that
“[t]he rhetoric of the juvenile court movement ha[d] developed
without any necessarily close correspondence to the realities of
court and institutional routines.”21 The facts of Gault exhibited
such a glaring departure from the benevolent and rehabilitative
ideal of the juvenile court that it spurred major constitutional
change.22 Three years later, the Court held, in In re Winship,
that juveniles are constitutionally entitled to the same criminal
trial standard of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”23
The Court extended many of the constitutional
protections available to adult criminal defendants to juvenile
defendants in recognition of the unavoidably adversarial
nature of the juvenile system.24 Thus, in both Gault and
Winship, the Court “emphasized the dual functions of
constitutional criminal procedures to ensure accurate factfinding and to protect against governmental oppression.”25
Especially telling was the Supreme Court’s decision that the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied
to juvenile court proceedings, demonstrating that despite the
state’s benevolent motives, a juvenile still required certain
fundamental protections against the power of the state.26
The Court, however, seemed to take a step back from
this philosophy not long after deciding Winship. At the end of
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4-58 (1967).
Id. at 29.
21 Id. at 30 (quoting STANTON WHEELER & LEONARD S. COTTRELL, JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY: ITS PREVENTION AND CONTROL 35 (1996)).
22 FELD, supra note 14, at 99-100.
23 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367-68 (1970). Several years before Gault was
decided, Chief Justice Warren had foreshadowed the possibility of the decision when,
speaking before the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges, he acknowledged that
the juvenile system was different from adult criminal court but expressed concern for
the possibility of “unbridled caprice.” FELD, supra note 14, at 99 (1999).
24 FELD, supra note 14, at 101.
25 Id. at 104.
26 Id. at 101.
19
20
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the same year Winship was decided, the Court heard
arguments in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania on whether a jury trial
is constitutionally required in a juvenile delinquency
proceeding.27 The Court’s recognition in Gault and Winship
that juvenile proceedings were in fact adversarial and could
result in significant consequences despite their purpose of
rehabilitation seemed to suggest that the Court would continue
the trend of applying adult procedural protections to juvenile
proceedings.28 Notably, between Gault and McKeiver, the Court
had decided Duncan v. Louisiana, holding that the right to a
jury in criminal prosecutions, guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment, applied to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.29
In McKeiver, the Court reiterated its holding in Duncan
“that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the
American scheme of justice” but stated that Duncan
does not automatically provide the answer to the present jury trial
issue, if for no other reason than that the juvenile court proceeding
has not yet been held to be a “criminal prosecution,” within the
meaning and reach of the Sixth Amendment, and also has not yet
been regarded as devoid of criminal aspects merely because it
usually has been given the civil label.30

The Court acknowledged the failure of the juvenile
system to achieve its idealistic goals, citing extensively from a
Presidential Commission report detailing these failures.31
However, the Court held that, nevertheless, “trial by jury in
the juvenile court’s adjudicative stage is not a constitutional
requirement.”32
The Court discussed Duncan at the beginning of its
opinion, but it decided the issue based on the Fourteenth
Amendment due process standard of “fundamental fairness,”
without delving into the intricacies of a Sixth Amendment
analysis.33 The Court’s avoidance of an explicit Sixth Amendment
analysis suggests it was uncomfortable with classifying juvenile

27
28
29

McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 528 (1971).
See FELD, supra note 14, at 101.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968); see also FELD, supra note

14, at 104.
McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528 at 540-41 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. at 543-45.
32 Id. at 545.
33 Id. at 540-43; see also FELD, supra note 14, at 104 (“[T]he Supreme Court decided
McKeiver solely on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and
‘fundamental fairness’ without reference to the Sixth Amendment or its Duncan rationale.”).
30
31
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delinquency adjudications either as entirely civil or entirely
criminal matters.
APPRENDI V. NEW JERSEY AND THE “CONVICTION
EXCEPTION”

II.

Decades after the Supreme Court’s line of cases
addressing constitutional protections in the juvenile system,
the Court found itself facing constitutional claims in an
entirely different area—the sentencing of adult defendants. In
2000, the Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey.34 In
Apprendi, under a plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to
two counts of possession of a firearm and one count of unlawful
possession of a bomb.35 The state of New Jersey reserved the
right to seek a higher sentence on one of the counts by applying
the state’s “hate crime” statute, claiming that the crime was
committed with a biased purpose based on a statement by
Apprendi suggesting a racial motive.36 After the trial judge
accepted the defendant’s guilty plea, the judge held an
evidentiary hearing, without a jury present, to determine whether
Apprendi’s acts were due to a biased purpose.37 The judge held
that Apprendi’s actions met the statutory requirements “by a
preponderance of the evidence” and that the sentencing
enhancement under the hate crime statute applied.38 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that “[o]ther than the fact of
a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”39
The Apprendi Court did not expressly overturn
McMillan v. Pennsylvania,40 a 1986 decision holding that a
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Id. at 469-70.
36 Id. at 470; See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 1999–2000) (“The
defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or
group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual
orientation or ethnicity.”).
37 Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 at 470.
38 Id. at 471.
39 Id. at 490. The Court acknowledged that the Apprendi holding confirms a
principle first expressed in a footnote to the Court’s opinion in Jones v. United States,
concerning a federal statute. See id. at 476; Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243,
n.6 (1999) (“[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice
and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than a prior
conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”). In Apprendi,
the Court explained that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment commands the same answer in
this case involving a state statute.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 at 476.
40 See generally Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466.
34
35
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“sentencing factor” could affect the judge’s sentencing decision
even if it was not found by a jury.41 The Court in Apprendi
made a point of stressing that in McMillan, it “did not,
however, . . . budge from the position that (1) constitutional
limits exist to States’ authority to define away facts necessary
to constitute a criminal offense . . . [and (2)] a state scheme
that keeps from the jury facts that ‘expos[e] [defendants] to
greater or additional punishment,’ may raise serious
constitutional concern.”42
The Apprendi Court’s discussion of a “sentencing factor”
was necessary for it to clarify how its decision fit in with
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, decided two years before
Apprendi.43 In Almendarez-Torres, the Court held that the use
of a previous conviction to sentence the defendant to a longer
term constituted a “sentencing factor” and not an element of the
crime that needed to be listed in an indictment.44 Therefore, it
did not violate due process or other constitutional provisions.45
The Almendarez-Torres holding applied only to criminal
indictments and was not concerned with sentencing procedures.
At issue in Almendarez-Torres was a federal statute enhancing
the maximum prison term for a deported alien returning to the
United States without permission, if he had previously been
deported upon conviction of an aggravated felony.46
The Apprendi Court explained that,
[b]ecause Almendarez-Torres had admitted the three earlier
convictions for aggravated felonies—all of which had been entered
pursuant to proceedings with substantial procedural safeguards of
their own—no question concerning the right to a jury trial or the
standard of proof that would apply to a contested issue of fact was
before the Court.47

The Almendarez-Torres decision focused on the general
characterization of recidivism as a “sentencing factor” that did
not need to be charged in the indictment.48 As AlmendarezTorres admitted to prior convictions for aggravated felonies,
the Court never reached the question of what constituted a

41 Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 at 485-86. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477
U.S. 79 (1986).
42 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 486 (2000) (citations omitted).
43 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226 (1998).
44 Id. at 226-27.
45 Id. at 226.
46 Id. at 224. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) & (b)(2) (2012).
47 Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 at 488.
48 See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224, 230 (1998).
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“conviction” under the statute in issue.49 Consequently, the
Apprendi Court did not overrule Almendarez-Torres because
the facts of the case still fit within the Apprendi holding
allowing for a “conviction exception” to the general rule that
facts enhancing the sentence should go before a jury.50 The
Court, however, went so far as to suggest that
it is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided, and
that a logical application of our reasoning today should apply if the
recidivist issue were contested. Apprendi does not contest the
decision’s validity and we need not revisit it for purposes of our
decision today to treat the case as a narrow exception to the general
rule we recalled at the outset. Given its unique facts, it surely does
not warrant rejection of the otherwise uniform course of decision
during the entire history of our jurisprudence.51

Recently, in Alleyne v. United States, the Court held
that Apprendi applies not only to facts that increase the
statutory maximum, but also facts that increase the mandatory
minimum.52 Therefore, “any fact that increases the mandatory
minimum is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury.”53
While Chief Judge Roberts’s dissenting opinion disagreed with
the application of Apprendi in the context of mandatory
minimums, he described the Apprendi rule as “draw[ing] its
legitimacy from two primary principles: (1) common law
understandings of the ‘elements’ of a crime, and (2) the need to
preserve the jury as a ‘strong barrier’ between defendants and
the State.”54

See id. at 248.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 at 487-90.
51 Id. at 489-90 (footnote omitted).
52 Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
53 Id. at 2153.
54 Id. at 2170 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Three days after Alleyne, the Court
issued another opinion concerning the Apprendi exception in Descamps v. United
States. See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). In Descamps, the Court
limited the amount of information a sentencing court can consider when determining
whether the defendant’s prior conviction falls under the ACCA as a “violent felony.” Id. at
2281-82.; see also Daniel Richman, Opinion Analysis: When Is a Burglary Not a Burglary?,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2013, 11:18 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/opinionanalysis-when-is-a-burglary-not-a-burglary/ (“Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment
just to make clear that he still wants Almendarez-Torres dead.”).
49
50
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III.

THE JUVENILE ADJUDICATION AS “PRIOR CONVICTION”
DILEMMA

A.

The “Armed Career Criminal Act”

Apprendi dealt with a state law, but the application of
the “conviction exception” has frequently arisen under the
ACCA, a federal act.55 The ACCA mandates a 15-year
minimum period of incarceration for defendants convicted of
possessing a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924, if the
defendant previously was convicted of three or more “violent
felonies” or “serious” drug offenses.56
The ACCA has forced many federal courts of appeals to
take up the issue of whether a defendant’s juvenile adjudication
should count as a prior conviction.57 The act defines “conviction”
as “includ[ing] a finding that a person has committed an act of
juvenile delinquency involving a violent felony.”58 While the
ACCA includes a juvenile adjudication in its definition of
conviction, the adjudication still must be a “conviction” under the
Apprendi exception, or else its use as a mandatory sentencing
enhancement without submission to a jury constitutes a violation
of due process.
As the language of the ACCA specifically indicates that
Congress intended for a juvenile delinquency adjudication to
count as a predicate conviction, federal circuit courts have
frequently been tasked with determining whether a juvenile
adjudication counts as an exception under Apprendi in the
context of the ACCA.59 The courts have also been faced with the
same constitutional question in light of similar state laws.60

55 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2011); See Daniel Richman, Opinion Analysis: When Is a
Burglary a “Burglary?”, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 4, 2013, 10:29 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2013/01/argument-preview-when-is-a-burglary-a-burglary/ (“Because its application
brings some of the federal system’s harshest mandatory penalties, and requires federal
courts to categorize a diverse range of prior state convictions . . . the Armed Career
Criminal Act (‘ACCA’), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), has provided the Court with considerable
business (and a fair amount of exasperation).”). See, e.g., supra notes 1-7 (describing
the application of the ACCA in the Washington case).
56 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e)(1) (2012).
57 Id. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012).
58 Id.
59 See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 426 (7th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 3019 (2011); United States v. Wright, 594 F.3d 259, 262-65 (4th Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 507 (2010); United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25 (1st
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1238 (2008).
60 See, e.g., Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
550 U.S. 933 (2007). These laws are commonly referred to as “Three Strikes Laws.”
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The Federal Courts of Appeals on Juvenile
Adjudications and Apprendi

A vast majority of federal circuit courts have decided
that a juvenile adjudication counts as a “conviction,” making it
an “exception” under Apprendi.61 While some courts of appeals
have carefully laid out the legal analysis under Apprendi,62
others have deferred to previous decisions in the state courts or
other circuit courts, relying on the fact that there is no “clearly
established federal law” in this area.63
One potentially confounding issue is that while the ACCA
is a federal statute and the Apprendi exception is a constitutional
due process concern, a previous juvenile adjudication will almost
always be determined under the state’s specific legal procedures
for juveniles.64 Even juveniles who violate federal law are
typically prosecuted by state authorities in the state’s juvenile
system unless the state “does not have jurisdiction or refuses to
assume jurisdiction over [the] juvenile.”65 Therefore, the state’s
procedures and characterization of juvenile adjudications is
relevant to the overall constitutional analysis.
While a majority of the courts of appeals now hold that
a juvenile adjudication should count as a previous conviction,
or a “strike” for ACCA purposes, the first case to address this
issue determined otherwise. In United States v. Tighe, decided
in 2001, the year following Apprendi, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that a juvenile adjudication does not
count as a “conviction” and therefore may not be used as a
sentencing enhancement under the ACCA.66 In Tighe, the
district court sentenced the defendant to a minimum term of 15
years in prison after the sentencing judge included a 1988
juvenile adjudication of reckless endangerment, robbery, and
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle as a prior conviction for a
61 See Welch, 604 F.3d at 426; Wright, 594 F.3d at 263-65; Matthews, 498
F.3d at 36; United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552
U.S. 1105 (2008); Boyd, 467 F.3d at 1151-52; United States v. Burge 407 F.3d 1183,
1186-87 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 981 (2005); United States v. Jones, 332
F.3d 688, 697-98 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 (2004); United States v.
Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1031-33 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1114 (2003).
62 See, e.g., Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1031-33; United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d
1187, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 2001).
63 See Boyd, 467 F.3d 1139 at 1142; Welch, 604 F.3d 408. See infra note 102
for the standard of review used when the federal court hears a habeas corpus petition
after the defendant was sentenced in state court.
64 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2012).
65 Id.
66 See Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187 at 1194-95.
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violent felony.67 The Ninth Circuit explained that Congress’s
characterization of a juvenile adjudication as a “prior
conviction” under the ACCA “ignores the significant
constitutional differences between adult convictions and juvenile
adjudications.”68 The court stressed that “[n]either Apprendi, nor
Almendarez-Torres—the case upon which Apprendi relied to
create the ‘prior conviction’ exception to its general rule—
specifically addressed the unique issues that distinguish
juvenile adjudications from adult convictions, such as the lack of
a right to a jury trial in most juvenile adjudications.”69
The Ninth Circuit looked carefully at United States v.
Jones,70 a Supreme Court case decided just before Apprendi and
upon which the Apprendi court relied.71 Although Jones did not
deal with a case involving a prior conviction, the Supreme
Court took the opportunity to discuss why convictions were
different from other elements that may increase a defendant’s
sentence: “One basis for that constitutional distinctiveness [of
prior convictions] is not hard to see: unlike virtually any other
consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense
. . . a prior conviction must itself have been established through
procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt[,] and
jury trial guarantees.”72 The Tighe court continued the Supreme
Court’s analysis to reason that
Jones’ recognition of prior convictions as a constitutionally
permissible sentencing factor was rooted in the concept that prior
convictions have been, by their very nature, subject to the
fundamental triumvirate of procedural protections intended to
guarantee the reliability of criminal convictions: fair notice,
reasonable doubt[,] and the right to a jury trial.73

Thus, the Tighe court pointed out that the basis for an
exception for convictions is inapplicable in juvenile adjudications
obtained without a right to a jury trial.74 The Tighe court then
Id. at 1190.
Id. at 1192-93.
69 Id. at 1193.
70 Id.; see also Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243-52 (1999) (holding
that a federal statute requiring a greater term of imprisonment when the offense
resulted in “serious bodily injury or death” constitutes separate elements of the offense
which must be presented to the jury).
71 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 472-73 (2000).
72 Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1193 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 249).
73 Id. at 1193.
74 Id. The Tighe court did not address the argument that some states may provide
juvenile delinquency defendants with the right to a jury trial as Tighe himself did not have
a right to a jury trial under Oregon state law. “It does not matter to this analysis whether
any state provides the right to a jury trial for juvenile adjudications. It is undisputed that
67
68
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completed the analysis by looking at whether the conviction
exception should be extended to include nonjury adjudications
and decided not to take such a step.75 The court reasoned that
such an extension of the Apprendi holding would be
unwarranted given “[t]he Apprendi Court’s serious reservations
about the reasoning of Almendarez-Torres [which] counsel
against any extension of that opinion’s holding.”76
In the year following Tighe, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the exact same issue in United States v.
Smalley, which also focused on the use of a juvenile adjudication
as a “conviction” under the ACCA.77 In Smalley, the defendant
had multiple prior juvenile adjudications which the trial court
counted as “convictions” to increase his sentence.78 The Smalley
court noted that the language of the ACCA indicated that
Congress intended for juvenile adjudications to count as
convictions, “[b]ut the issue of whether juvenile adjudications
can be characterized as prior convictions for Apprendi purposes
is a constitutional question implicating Mr. Smalley’s right not
to be deprived of liberty without due process of law.”79 The
court then went on to describe the holding of Tighe, noting it
was the only federal court case on point.80
The Smalley court disagreed with the Tighe holding,
reasoning that the Court’s opinion in Apprendi did not take a
position on what constitutes sufficient procedural safeguards in
every situation:
We think that while the Court established what constitutes
sufficient procedural safeguards (a right to jury trial and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt), and what does not (judge-made findings
under a lesser standard of proof), the Court did not take a position
on possibilities that lie between these two poles.81

Tighe was not provided a jury when he was adjudged a juvenile delinquent in Oregon . . . .”
Id. at 1194 n.4. Therefore, the court did not consider whether a juvenile adjudication based
on a jury verdict would count as a “conviction” under Apprendi. Id.
75 Id. at 1194.
76 Id. “Even though it is arguable . . . Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly
decided, and that a logical application of our reasoning today should apply if the
recidivist issue were contested, Apprendi does not contest the decision’s validity and we
need not revisit it for purposes of our decision today to treat the case as a narrow
exception to the general rule we recalled at the outset.” Id. (quoting Apprendi v. United
States, 530 U.S. 466, 489-90 (2000)).
77 United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1031 (8th Cir. 2002).
78 Id. at 1031.
79 Id. at 1031-32 (internal quotations omitted).
80 Id. at 1032.
81 Id.
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The Smalley court “conclude[d] that the question of
whether juvenile adjudications should be exempt from
Apprendi’s general rule should not turn on the narrow parsing
of words, but on an examination of whether juvenile
adjudications, like adult convictions, are so reliable that due
process of law is not offended by such an exemption.”82 The court
then determined that they are,83 went on to list the many other
procedural safeguards available to juvenile defendants,84 and
concluded by stating that a jury in a juvenile proceeding is not
constitutionally required under McKeiver v. Pennsylvania.85
The Third Circuit soon faced the same issue in United
States v. Jones, where the court held that a nonjury juvenile
adjudication counts as a conviction under the Apprendi
exception.86 The court adopted the reasoning of the Smalley court,
stating “we find nothing in Apprendi or Jones, two cases relied
upon by the Tighe court and [the defendant] on this appeal,
that requires us to hold that prior nonjury juvenile
adjudications that afforded all required due process safeguards
cannot be used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA.”87
While the defendant, Jones, lost in front of the Third
Circuit, he succeeded on a subsequent appeal on the only basis
available to him—the fact that he was unrepresented by
Id. at 1032-33.
Id.
84 “For starters, juvenile defendants have the right to notice, the right to
counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege against
self-incrimination. A judge in a juvenile proceeding, moreover, must find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt before he or she can convict.” Id. at 1033 (internal citations omitted).
Interestingly, now that the court has reasoned juvenile adjudications to be counted as
prior convictions, the court uses the term “convict” rather than the proper procedural
term, “adjudicate.”
85 Id. See generally McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
86 United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3d Cir. 2003). A year earlier, the
Third Circuit had avoided having to make a definitive ruling on the precise issue by
holding that, in the case before it, the juvenile adjudication did not constitute a “violent
felony” under the language of the ACCA. United States v. Richardson, 313 F.3d 121,
127 (3d Cir. 2002). The Richardson court noted that, “as Richardson’s case well
illustrates, [the ACCA] provides for dramatically increased penalties.” Id. at 123. The
trial court applied the ACCA enhancement to Richardson’s case by counting a “juvenile
adjudication for robbery and other offenses, along with two adult convictions for
possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute.” Id. The court noted that if the
enhancement did not apply, Richardson’s sentence would have been limited to a ten
year statutory maximum, and he likely would have been sentenced within the guideline
range of eight and a third to ten years. Id. (emphasis added). If the ACCA enhancement
applied, Richardson faced a minimum sentence of fifteen years, with sentencing
guidelines of roughly nineteen and a half to twenty four years. Id. (emphasis added). The
trial court, counting the juvenile adjudication as a conviction, sentenced Richardson to
235 months, or roughly nineteen and a half years in prison—nearly twice the maximum
allowable period of incarceration if no such enhancement applied. Id.
87 Id.
82
83
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counsel at his juvenile adjudication.88 If juvenile adjudications
count as convictions, then federal defendants are bound by
Custis v. United States, a 1994 Supreme Court case holding
that “a defendant in a federal sentencing proceeding . . . has no
[ ] right (with the sole exception of convictions obtained in
violation of the right to counsel) to collaterally attack prior
convictions.”89 Therefore, if juvenile adjudications count as
convictions under federal laws such as the ACCA, then the only
basis on which a defendant may attack the validity of his prior
adjudication was if he or she was unrepresented by counsel at
the proceeding.90 Any other suggested procedural deficits are
insufficient.
Following the Third Circuit, other federal appellate
courts began to almost uniformly adopt reasoning similar to
Smalley and hold that juvenile adjudications count as
convictions and therefore fall under the Apprendi exception.91
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals “base[d] [its] holding on
the reasoning of . . . Smalley and Jones.”92 The Sixth,93 First,94
Fourth,95 and Seventh96 Circuits followed suit over the next five
years, echoing the reasoning that juvenile adjudications are

88 See United States v. Jones, No. 2:01-CR-0136, 2006 WL 2939744 at *1-3
(W.D. Penn., Oct. 13, 2006). The court’s opinion is noteworthy as it anecdotally sheds
light on the possibility of procedural deficits in juvenile adjudications. The certified
record of the defendant’s adjudication was silent regarding whether he was represented
by counsel. Id. at *1. At the evidentiary hearing, the defendant Jones testified that he
was not represented by counsel during his juvenile adjudication and the juvenile court
judge never inquired whether he wanted counsel. Id. at *2. Jones also testified that he
never took the stand, he did not cross-examine any witnesses, and his co-defendant’s
counsel did not cross-examine any witnesses. Id. Finally, he testified that the hearing
lasted 10 minutes. Id. “Jones testified that he did not appeal the Juvenile Adjudication
because he lacked the resources or knowledge to do so.” Id. The juvenile court judge
could not recall the specifics of Jones’ case, although he “conceded that he may not have
asked the parent of an unrepresented co-defendant whether the defendant waived his
right to counsel if [he] mistakenly thought the attorney present at the hearing was
representing both co-defendants.” Id. at *3.
89 See Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994).
90 Id.
91 See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 3019 (2011); United States v. Wright, 594 F.3d 259 (4th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 507 (2010); United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1238 (2008); Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2006),
cert. denied, 550 U.S. 933 (2007); United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744 (6th Cir.
2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1105 (2008); United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183 (11th
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 981 (2005).
92 Burge, 407 F.3d at 1190.
93 Crowell, 493 F.3d at 750-51.
94 Matthews, 498 F.3d at 35-36.
95 Wright, 594 F.3d at 264.
96 Welch, 604 F.3d at 429.
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just as reliable and are afforded with all the protections
constitutionally required.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit, which originally decided
Tighe, narrowed the holding even more when the court
addressed the use of juvenile adjudications to enhance
sentences under state law in Boyd v. Newland.97 In Boyd, the
state court considered the defendant’s prior nonjury juvenile
adjudication in deciding to increase his sentence.98 The Ninth
Circuit reiterated its holding from Tighe, stating:
We have held that the Apprendi “prior conviction” exception
encompasses only those proceedings that provide a defendant with
the procedural safeguards of a jury trial and of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Consequently, we do not recognize nonjury
juvenile adjudications as “convictions” falling within the Apprendi
exception, and ordinarily we do not allow sentencing enhancements
based on such adjudications.99

The court, however, continued to recognize the dilemma
that, in the years following Tighe, California state courts
disagreed with the holding and have declined to follow it.100 The
court also acknowledged that subsequent federal appellate
court decisions in other circuits disagreed with their
interpretation.101 Faced with conflicting interpretations the
court stated:
Although we are not suggesting that Tighe was incorrectly decided,
as some of these varying interpretations of Apprendi suggest, the
opinion does not represent clearly established federal law ‘as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’ In general,
Ninth Circuit precedent remains persuasive authority in
determining what is clearly established federal law. But in the face
of authority that is directly contrary to Tighe, and in the absence of
explicit direction from the Supreme Court, we cannot hold that the
California courts’ use of Petitioner’s juvenile adjudication as a
sentencing enhancement was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent.102
See generally Boyd, 467 F.3d 1139.
Id. at 1151.
99 Id. at 1151-52 (citations omitted).
100 See id. at 1152.
101 Id.
102 Id. (citations omitted). As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was deciding
a habeas corpus petition arising from a state court judgment, such a deferential
standard of review was required under federal law:
97
98

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to a judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim—
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Taking Tighe and Boyd together now leads to an
incongruous result: in the state of California, a defendant’s
juvenile adjudication counts as a conviction under Apprendi
when the defendant is prosecuted under state law while that
exact same adjudication may not qualify as a conviction under
federal law. In other words, the use of the adjudication to
enhance a sentence under state law is constitutionally valid,
while that same use under federal law is a violation of the
defendant’s constitutional right to due process.
When the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Welch v.
United States followed the reasoning of the other circuits and
held that a juvenile adjudication counts as a conviction under
the Apprendi exception, Judge Posner wrote a strong dissenting
opinion.103 His dissent focuses on two distinct reasons why a
juvenile adjudication should not count as a conviction: the
different procedures and different objectives in the juvenile
court system.104
In terms of different procedures, Judge Posner begins by
recognizing that a juvenile adjudication “is best described as
‘quasi-criminal.’”105 His opinion further acknowledges that
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania holds that a jury is not required in a
juvenile court proceeding to imprison (i.e. “ remand”) a juvenile,
[b]ut whether a juvenile can be imprisoned on the basis of findings
made by a juvenile-court judge rather than by a jury is different
from whether a “conviction” so procured (if it should even be called a
“conviction”) is the kind of “prior conviction” to which the Court
referred in Apprendi, namely a conviction that can be used to jack up
a person’s sentence beyond what would otherwise be the statutory
maximum.106

Posner points out that the Apprendi Court implied the
predicate conviction would be determined by a jury;
[o]therwise[,] why does the Supreme Court require that any fact, as
distinct from a conviction, used to enhance a sentence be a fact found
by a jury (unless of course the defendant waived a jury)? Why didn’t

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States[.]
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2011).
103 See Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 429-32 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner,
J., dissenting).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 430.
106 Id. at 430-31.
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the Court just say that the fact must be found by a reliable
means?107

Posner notes that the Court in Jones v. United States
specifically pointed out that “a prior conviction must itself have
been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice,
reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.”108 These three
procedural requirements are not explicitly stated in Apprendi
and many courts considered the absence of such a statement in
determining that juvenile adjudications should count as prior
convictions,109 essentially reading the Apprendi holding in a
vacuum. Posner argues:
The Court in Apprendi did not take [these three procedural
requirements] back when it said that
if a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by
statute when an offense is committed under certain
circumstances but not others, it is obvious that both the loss
of liberty and the stigma attaching to the offense are
heightened; it necessarily follows that the defendant should
not—at the moment the State is put to proof of those
circumstances—be deprived of protections that have, until
that point, unquestionably attached.
The defendant in this case was not “deprived of protections” that had
attached to his juvenile-court proceeding.110

Although Posner does not explicitly say so, he seems to
suggest that the language in Apprendi naturally follows from
Jones. How else do we know what “protections” the Court is
referring to? Furthermore, while the Apprendi Court did not
overrule Almendarez-Torres, the Court left it on extremely narrow
footing,111 which is telling considering that Almendarez-Torres
involved predicate convictions that actually were subject to the
same procedural protections, including the right to a jury trial.112
The next section of Posner’s dissent is particularly
interesting as it puts forth novel arguments and employs
language similar to recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on the
punishment of juveniles. Posner discusses the objectives of the
juvenile court system as constituting a concern separate and
107
108
109

Id. at 431.
Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999)).
Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 431 (7th Cir. 20120) (Posner, J.,

dissenting).
110
111
112

Id. (citations omitted).
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 489-90 (2000).
Id. at 488.
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distinct from the procedures of the juvenile system.113 This part
of Posner’s opinion responds to the argument previously
articulated by other courts of appeals that a nonjury juvenile
adjudication which provides the defendant all the procedural due
process afforded under McKeiver, cannot “become” a due
process violation later down the road just because it is used to
enhance an adult sentence.114 The basic argument is simply:
once constitutional, always constitutional. Posner challenges
this assumption, arguing that
[t]he constitutional protections to which juveniles have been held to
be entitled have been designed with a different set of objectives in
mind than just recidivist enhancement. So the mere fact that a
juvenile had all the process he was entitled to doesn’t make his
juvenile conviction equivalent, for purposes of recidivist
enhancement, to adult convictions.115

Posner then continues to challenge the McKeiver court’s
assumption that juvenile adjudications determined by judges
are just as reliable as criminal convictions by juries.116 Posner
points to subsequent research suggesting that this is not the
case.117 He expresses a major concern which is “[o]f particular
relevance to Apprendi [that] the literature finds that judges are
more likely to convict in juvenile cases than juries are in
criminal cases.”118 Posner suggests several reasons to explain
this phenomenon:
Juvenile-court judges are exposed to inadmissible evidence; they
hear the same stories from defendants over and over again, leading
them to treat defendants’ testimony with skepticism; they become
chummy with the police and apply a lower standard of scrutiny to
the testimony of officers whom they have come to trust; and they
make their decisions alone rather than as a group and so their
Welch, 604 F.3d 431-34 (Posner, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2002).
115 Welch, 604 F.3d at 431-32 (Posner, J., dissenting). Judge Posner makes the
comparison to a guilty conviction for a military crime, obtained in front of a military
commission without the right to a jury trial, being later used to enhance a “conviction of a
conventional crime” and concludes that “would stretch Apprendi awfully far.” Id. at 432.
116 Id. at 432.
117 Id. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a
Breeding Ground for Wrongful Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257, 260 (2007) (arguing
that juveniles make “less competent trial defendants” and “also tend to be more
compliant and suggestible during police interrogations, two traits which are risk
factors for false confessions”); see generally Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz,
Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice: Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile
Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 556 (1998) (arguing “juries are
generally more likely than judges to be fair and just triers of fact on the issue of guilt or
innocence in a criminal or delinquency case”).
118 Welch, 604 F.3d 408 at 432.
113
114
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decisions lack the benefits of group deliberation. It would be hasty to
conclude that juvenile-court judges are more prone to convict the
innocent than juries are. But if it is true that juvenile defendants
fare worse before judges than they would before juries—if there is
reason to think that trial by jury would alter the outcomes in a
nontrivial proportion of juvenile cases—one cannot fob off the
Apprendi argument with the observation that a jury makes no
difference.119

In addition to a greater likelihood that judges will find
the defendant delinquent, Posner argues that juvenile
delinquency defendants are also less likely to appeal or seek
postconviction relief.120 Finally, Posner expresses special concern
that the majority of the court may be deciding the issue based
upon a “circuit scorecard, without independent consideration of
the issues”121 and finds it “telling” that the government is
unable “to give a reasoned basis” for its position that a juvenile
adjudication should count as a conviction.122 He concludes with
a call to the Supreme Court, as “only the [Court] can decide
authoritatively what its decisions mean.”123
C.

Juveniles as a Class Distinguishable from Adults

Although McKeiver v. Pennsylvania stands as the last
case ruling on what procedures are constitutionally required in
juvenile delinquency proceedings, the Court has decided cases
within the last seven years expressly concerning the treatment
and punishment of juveniles under the Eighth Amendment
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.124 While the
119 Id. (emphasis added). While Judge Posner comments that it would be
“hasty to conclude juvenile-court judges are more prone to convict the innocent than
juries are,” some scholarship has argued that juveniles are at special risk of being
wrongfully convicted. See Drizin & Luloff, supra note 117. Drizin and Luloff argue that
juveniles are at special risk for wrongful convictions primarily because they “make less
competent trial defendants” and exhibit “risk factors for false confessions.” Id. at 260.
While those factors exist regardless of whether the fact finder at trial is a judge or jury,
they further argue that “[t]he risk of wrongful convictions in juvenile court proceedings
may also be increased by a lack of many of the due process protections afforded adult
criminal defendants,” as well as “the fact that few juvenile cases are appealed and even
fewer post-conviction and habeas cases are filed involving juveniles.” Id. at 260; Martin
Guggenheim and Randy Hertz take an approach which strongly supports Posner’s
assertion and argues that while juries are not necessarily more likely to reach the
“correct” outcome, they provide a higher quality of factfinding than bench trials. See
Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 117, at 553, 562-82.
120 Welch, 604 F.3d 408 at 432.
121 Id. at 431.
122 Id. at 432.
123 Id.
124 See generally Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida,
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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Gault line of cases determined the procedures afforded to
juveniles in the juvenile court system specifically, this line of
cases dealt with the treatment of juveniles in the adult
criminal system as all of the defendants were prosecuted and
sentenced as adults.125
In Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that the execution
of juveniles who were under 18 years old at the time of their
crimes constituted cruel and unusual punishment barred by
the Eighth Amendment.126 The Court focused on juveniles as a
group distinguishable from adults, outlining “[t]hree general
differences between juveniles under 18 and adults [which]
demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be
classified among the worst offenders.”127 The Court found that
juveniles, in comparison to adults, have a lack of maturity, a
vulnerability to peer pressure, and a still-evolving character.128
The Court argued that these differences mean that juveniles’
“irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of
an adult.”129 “From a moral standpoint it would be misguided to
equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a
greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies
will be reformed.”130 The Court thus concluded that, in light of
such diminished capacity, the justifications of the death
penalty of retribution and deterrence do not apply to juveniles
with the same force as adults.131
Five years later, in Graham v. Florida, the Supreme
Court addressed the imposition of life without parole on juveniles
who did not commit homicide and held such punishment to be
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.132 The Graham
Court summarized Roper as “establish[ing] that because
juveniles have lessened culpability they are less deserving of
the most severe punishments.”133 In determining whether the
punishment was proportional to the crime under the Eighth
125

See generally Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2445; Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011; Roper, 543

U.S. 551.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (2005).
Id. at 569.
128 Id. at 569-70.
129 Id. at 570 (internal citation omitted).
130 Id.
131 Id. at 571. The Court’s holding is especially noteworthy given that the
beginning of its opinion was devoted to outlining the callous nature of the murder
committed by the seventeen-year-old defendant. Id. at 555-58. One of the State’s
aggravating factors in seeking the death penalty was that the murder “involved depravity
of mind and was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman.” Id. at 557.
132 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
133 Id. at 2026.
126
127
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Amendment, the Court concluded that, “compared to an adult
murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill
has a twice diminished moral culpability. The age of the
offender and the nature of the crime each bear on the
analysis.”134 As in its Roper analysis, the Court addressed the
State’s justifications of retribution and deterrence and
concluded them to be insufficient.135 The Court’s conclusion that
retribution was an inadequate justification was directly related
to its assessment of the relative culpability of juveniles,
stating,
Retribution is a legitimate reason to punish, but it cannot support
the sentence at issue here. Society is entitled to impose severe
sanctions on a juvenile nonhomicide offender to express its
condemnation of the crime and to seek restoration of the moral
imbalance caused by the offense. But [t]he heart of the retribution
rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the
personal culpability of the criminal offender. And as Roper observed,
“[w]hether viewed as an attempt to express the community’s moral
outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the
victim, the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with
an adult.”136

The analysis of the diminished culpability of juveniles is central to
the Graham opinion as the Court does not hold life without parole
for non-homicide adult offenders to be unconstitutional.
The most recent Supreme Court case on juvenile
offenders as a group distinct from adults is Miller v. Alabama,
decided in 2012. In Miller, the Court held that, even in the case
of homicide offenses, “mandatory life without parole for those
under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual
punishments.’”137 Unlike Roper and Graham, Miller did not hold
that a type of punishment was unlawful based on the category of
the offender; instead, the Court held that a type of punishment,
while lawful, was unconstitutional if mandatorily applied to
juveniles.138 Only the procedure was at issue. The reasoning for
the constitutional violation is that the state’s mandatory
sentencing “scheme prevents those meting out punishment from
considering a ‘juvenile’s lessened culpability’ and greater ‘capacity
for change.’”139 Such a scheme essentially ignores the precepts of
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id. at 2027 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2028.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005)).
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Roper and Graham “that children are constitutionally different
from adults for purposes of sentencing.”140 The Court reiterated
that the recognition of juveniles as having diminished culpability
compared to adults rests on common sense as well as the support
of biology and social science.141
While the defendants in Miller faced prosecution and
sentencing in the adult criminal system, the Court’s reasoning
echoes the original justification for the juvenile court system,
stating that “[l]ife without parole forswears altogether the
rehabilitative ideal. It reflects an irrevocable judgment about
[an offender’s] value and place in society, at odds with a child’s
capacity for change.”142 In addition to reiterating the recognition
from Roper and Graham that juveniles are less culpable than
adults who have committed the same crime, Miller adds a
decidedly different analysis. Miller ruled the procedure of
mandatorily imposing the punishment, as opposed to the
punishment itself, constitutionally impermissible.143 Such
procedure ran afoul of the Eighth Amendment because it did
not take into account the lessened culpability of juveniles and
instead completely equated juveniles with adults.
D.

Apprendi after Miller and Graham

Since deciding Apprendi in 2000, the Supreme Court
has not ruled on whether juvenile delinquency adjudications
count as convictions and therefore need not be submitted to a
jury during sentencing.144 As the federal courts of appeals have
struggled with that question, the Supreme Court’s understanding
and conception of juveniles has evolved as evidenced by its
decisions in Roper, Graham, and Miller. The language of these
cases all stress the lessened culpability of juveniles and the
“rehabilitative ideal,”145 justifications upon which the juvenile
Id. at 2464.
Id. at 2464-65.
142 Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
143 Id. at 2466.
144 But see infra notes 151-58 for a discussion on recent petitions for certiorari
and recent indications which could suggest the Court may be amenable to addressing
the issue soon.
145 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 (“Once the diminished culpability of juveniles is
recognized, it is evident that the penological justifications for the death penalty apply
to them with lesser force than to adults.”); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (“[The State’s]
judgment is not appropriate in light of a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s capacity for
change and limited moral culpability.”); Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (“So Graham and
Roper and our individualized sentencing cases alike teach that in imposing a State’s
harshest penalties, a sentencer misses too much if he treats every child as an adult.”).
140
141
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court system was originally founded.146 These cases have made
it vitally important for the Supreme Court to take up the issue
and explicitly rule on whether juvenile delinquency adjudications
are convictions under the language of Apprendi.
As previously discussed, the language of Apprendi itself
demonstrated the Court’s already apparent uneasiness with its
holding in Almendarez-Torres, allowing a “conviction
exception.”147 In 2011, the Court considered granting certiorari
petitions in cases that challenged the Almendarez-Torres
decision altogether—choosing to relist the cases and call for
briefs.148 This is an even broader issue given that if the Court
were to overrule Almendarez-Torres, it would get rid of the
problem with the use of juvenile delinquencies altogether as
there would no longer be a “conviction exception.” The Court
ultimately denied certiorari in those petitions.149
In May 2012, before the Court decided Miller, it
considered granting certiorari in Staunton v. California,150 a
case in which the court used a juvenile delinquency adjudication
under Apprendi to increase the defendant’s sentence.151 The
Court did not immediately deny certiorari, but instead relisted
the case for another conference to consider the petition.152 In
fact, the Court actually requested the record in the Staunton
case.153 Despite eventually denying certiorari,154 the Court’s
actions suggest a willingness to eventually take up the issue if
presented with amenable facts.155 Granting certiorari in a case
See FELD, supra note 14, at 60.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 489-90 (2000).
148 John Elwood, Re-list Watch: Will the Court Reconsider Almendarez-Torres?,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 27, 2011, 3:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/01/re-listwatch-will-the-court-reconsider-almendarez-torres/.
149 Vazquez v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1135 (2011); Ayala-Segoviano v.
United States, 131 S. Ct. 1465 (2011).
150 See Staunton v. California, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012) for denial of certiorari.
For the case below, see People v. Huggins, No. H036254, 2011 WL 4852287 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2011) (Mr. Staunton was a co-defendant in People v. Huggins.)
151 John Elwood, Relist (and Hold) Watch, SCOTUSBLOG (May. 17, 2012,
10:55 AM) http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/05/relist-and-hold-watch-19/.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Staunton v. California, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012).
155 Though the Court eventually denied the petition for certiorari, Staunton’s
case and the trial court’s decision offered a less than perfect set of facts. Id. Staunton’s
prior juvenile adjudication that counted as a “strike” under California state law was a
juvenile offense for robbery committed fourteen years prior to the offense in question.
See People v. Huggins, No. H036254, 2011 WL 4852287 at *3 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Oct.
13, 2011) (Mr. Staunton was a co-defendant in People v. Huggins.) In addition to the
juvenile offense, however, Staunton had eight prior felony convictions, several prior
misdemeanor convictions, was on parole when he was convicted of the offense in
question, and had violated parole at least once before. Id. at *2. The trial court denied
146
147
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involving the use of a juvenile delinquency adjudication under
Apprendi would allow the Court to revisit the original
justification of the Almendarez-Torres “conviction exception”
without forcing its hand on whether or not that decision should
be entirely overruled.
If the Supreme Court does not choose to directly address
the use of juvenile adjudications within the “conviction
exception” in light of its decisions in Graham and Miller, it seems
unlikely the lower courts will do so. While some circuit courts
have ruled on the use of juvenile delinquency adjudications since
Roper was decided in 2005, none have explicitly considered any of
the language or reasoning in the Roper line of cases.156 That is
likely because: (1) the Roper cases were all decided based on the
Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment
rather than on due process grounds,157 and (2) all of the Roper
cases involved juveniles tried as adults in the adult criminal
system, and thus did not implicate juvenile adjudications. No
federal court of appeals has ruled on the use of juvenile
delinquency adjudications under Apprendi since Miller was
decided in 2012.158 This is noteworthy because Miller deemed a
process that equated juveniles and adults in terms of sentencing
constitutionally offensive.159 What does this mean then for
Staunton’s request to exclude the use of the juvenile adjudication as a prior strike
based on “the facts and circumstances of not only this [juvenile] offense but Mr.
Staunton’s background.” Id. at *3. The trial court also considered that Staunton had
been convicted of two felony offenses in the time since the juvenile offense. Id. On
appeal, the Sixth District declined to address the issue any further. Id. at *4.
156 See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 3019 (2011); United States v. Wright, 594 F.3d 259 (4th Cir. 2010), cert
denied, 131 S. Ct. 507 (2010); United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1238 (2008); United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744 (6th Cir.
2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1105 (2008); Boyd v. Newland, 437 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir.
2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 933 (2007); United States v. Burge 407 F.3d 1183 (11th
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 981 (2005).
157 See Beth Caldwell, Twenty-Five to Life for Adolescent Mistakes: Juvenile
Strikes as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 581, 581-86 (2012)
(arguing that, based on the reasoning of Graham v. Florida, the use of prior juvenile
adjudications constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
158 While the Washington case discussed supra notes 1-2 & 4-7 was decided at
the end of 2012 and thus was after Miller, the court decision makes no mention of
Apprendi and it is not argued in the defendant-appellant’s brief. See United States v.
Washington, 706 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2012); Brief of Defendant/Appellant at 5, United
States v. Washington, 706 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-6339), 2012 WL 1074455
at *11. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet decided on whether the use of
juvenile adjudications is a violation of Apprendi. In dealing with state cases on habeas
corpus claims, the Tenth Circuit has held a state court’s determination that such use is
not a violation of Apprendi is “neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Supreme Court precedent.” See Harris v. Roberts, No. 12-3045, 2012
WL2354433 at *2 (10th Cir. 2012).
159 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466 (2012).
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treating juvenile delinquency adjudications to be equivalent to
adult criminal convictions for the purposes of sentencing?
E.

Juvenile Adjudications Should Not Count Under the
Apprendi “Conviction Exception”

There are two separate bases on which the use of
juvenile delinquency adjudications should not be counted as
equivalent to prior convictions under Apprendi: (1) the fact that
juvenile delinquency adjudications are not supported by a jury
trial guarantee, which is assumed as a prerequisite under the
language of Apprendi,160 and (2) recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence recognizing and reiterating that juveniles are less
culpable than adults and more capable of rehabilitation. The
second basis, in particular, would mark a return to the
conception upon which the juvenile court was founded and the
paramount justification for a separate court system for juveniles.
1. The Use of Juvenile Adjudications as “Prior
Convictions” Is a Violation of Due Process Because
They Are Not Supported by a Jury Trial Guarantee
Because McKeiver has never been overturned, there is
no constitutional right to a jury trial in a juvenile delinquency
proceeding.161 While a juvenile adjudication obtained without a
jury trial is therefore constitutionally valid, many scholars
argue that the language and reasoning of the Apprendi opinion
require that the defendant had a right to a jury trial even
though the Court did not explicitly define a “conviction.”162 The
question then becomes—why does the language of Apprendi
suggest that a “conviction” must have been obtained with a
right to a jury trial? What procedural safeguards underlie a
right to a jury that would require it?
Some authors have argued that the jury plays an
important role in protecting against governmental oppression.163
But the decision in McKeiver not to extend the right to a jury
trial to juvenile court proceedings demonstrated that the Court
See infra note 165.
See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 528 (1971).
162 See e.g., Feld, supra note 13; Abbott, supra note 13; Schneider supra note
13; Thill, supra note 13.
163 See, e.g., Andrew Sokol, Comment, Juvenile Adjudications as Elevating
Factors in Subsequent Adult Sentencing and the Structural Role of the Jury, 13 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 791, 804-09 (2011) (focusing on the institutional role of the jury as
protection from tyranny by the government).
160
161
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was only concerned with accurate fact-finding in order for the
adjudication to be constitutionally sound.164 Many of the circuit
courts arrived at their decisions regarding the use of juvenile
adjudications by interpreting the holding of Apprendi to focus on
the reliability of the previous proceeding.165 Therefore, the courts
reason, if McKeiver holds that a right to a jury trial is not required
for juveniles because judges are just as reliable, and Apprendi
holds that convictions are exempted from going in front of a jury
because convictions are reliable, then juvenile adjudications may be
equated with convictions for the purpose of sentencing without
violating the defendant’s right to due process.166
But many critics, including Judge Posner,167 have
challenged the factual basis of the McKeiver court’s assumption
that judges are just as reliable as juries,168 leading others to
argue that the unreliability of juvenile adjudications prohibit
equating them with adult convictions.169 Others go as far as to
argue that McKeiver should be overruled, which would result in
a constitutional right to a jury trial during the juvenile
delinquency proceeding.170
Further, even if McKeiver were overruled and juveniles
were granted the right to jury trials, there are still significant
concerns that juvenile adjudications are less reliable than adult
convictions based on the nature of juveniles themselves.
Professor Steven Drizin and Greg Luloff suggest that a
FELD, supra note 14, at 104.
See, e.g., United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2002)
(juvenile adjudications are “so reliable that due process of law is not offended by such
an exemption”); see also Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 2010).
166 See, e.g., Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1033; see also Welch v. United States, 604
F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 2010).
167 Welch, 604 F.3d at 432-34.
168 See Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 117.
169 See, e.g., Feld, supra note 13, at 1120 (arguing that until McKeiver is
overruled it is “unfair[ ] [to use] procedurally deficient, factually unreliable convictions
to enhance subsequent sentences. States which deny delinquents jury trials in the
contemporary punitive juvenile justice system compound that inequity when they use
those nominally rehabilitative sentences to extend terms of adult imprisonment.”);
Abbott, supra note 13, at 91-92; Schneider, supra note 13, at 863 (arguing that juvenile
adjudications without jury trials constitute “a deal between the state and the
juvenile. . . . [where] the juvenile ideally receives treatment and in return surrenders
certain procedural protections . . . . The state fails to hold up its end of the deal when it
treats the juvenile adjudication as an adult conviction.”); Thill, supra note 13, at 90-98
(arguing that the exception only applies narrowly to convictions obtained with a right
to jury trial guarantee). But see Kennedy, supra note 13 (arguing that juvenile
adjudications should fall under the conviction exception as they are reliable).
170 See, e.g., Feld, supra note 13, at 1124; Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile
Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 68 (1997) (arguing that the juvenile court should be abolished and
youthfulness should be recognized as a mitigating factor in criminal proceedings).
164
165
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multitude of factors may contribute to decreased reliability
with juvenile adjudications as studies suggest juveniles are “at
special risk of being wrongfully convicted . . . especially when it
comes to false confessions” and developmental differences
“make juveniles less competent trial defendants . . . [and] more
compliant and suggestible during police interrogations.”171 The
Supreme Court recognized in Graham v. Florida that some of
“the features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put them
at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings. . . . They
are less likely than adults to work effectively with their lawyers to
aid in their defense.”172 Other scholars have been disturbed by the
high incidence of waiver of counsel in the juvenile courts173 and
even if the child is represented, some authors have argued that
there is a strong concern for ineffective assistance of counsel in
juvenile cases.174 Notably, a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel would be brought on appeal and, as Judge Posner pointed
out in his dissent in Welch, there is a much lower rate of appeal in
juvenile court cases.175 Recently, Megan Annitto, Director of the
Center for Law and Public Service at West Virginia University
College of Law, examined data measuring the rates of juvenile
appeals in 15 states and appellate decisions over a period of 10
years.176 She described juvenile courts as “an area of the law
where the appellate role and transparency to the public is
overwhelmingly absent.”177 These findings and studies on
reliability in the juvenile court system suggest that, even if
Apprendi is read to only require a reliable previous adjudication,
simply requiring jury trials will not necessarily make juvenile
adjudications as reliable as adult convictions.178
Drizin & Luloff, supra note 117, at 257-60 (2007).
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010).
173 See, e.g., Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel:
Waiver in the Juvenile Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 577 (2002) (arguing that permitting
juveniles to waive counsel constitutes a denial of the right to counsel and that due
process requires that juvenile courts should not accept waiver of counsel by juveniles).
174 See, e.g., Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 771, 774 (2010).
175 See Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 432 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
176 Megan Annitto, Juvenile Justice on Appeal, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 671, 672 (2012).
177 Id.
178 While the aforementioned findings on reliability rely heavily on social
science and research as opposed to court opinions, the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Roper, Graham, and Miller all evinced a willingness to look to such research and
findings when considering the relative culpability and rehabilitative capacity of
juveniles. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464-68 (2012); Graham v. Florida,
130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026-30 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568-73 (2005).
Therefore, if the Court decided primarily to focus on the reliability of juvenile
171
172
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2. Equating Prior Juvenile Adjudications with
Convictions is a Violation of Due Process Because the
Supreme Court Characterizes Juveniles as a Class
Categorically Less Culpable than Adults
Many scholars and authors have argued against
juvenile adjudications falling under the “conviction exception”
on the basis that such adjudications have not been subjected to
a jury trial guarantee and, subsequently, are either not as
reliable as convictions obtained by juries or do not provide
adequate protection from governmental oppression.179 This note
advances a second argument: based on the Supreme Court’s
recognition of juveniles in Roper, Graham, and Miller as a class
categorically less culpable than adults, juvenile adjudications
are fundamentally different than adult convictions and therefore
their use as mandatory sentence enhancements constitutes a
violation of due process.180
Over time, both the courts and the academic community
have voiced doubts over whether the juvenile court system truly
embraces the “rehabilitative ideal” upon which it was founded.181
Even in McKeiver, despite holding that a right to a jury was not
constitutionally required, the Court was still concerned with the
failures of the juvenile court to live up to its intended purpose.182
The Supreme Court’s most recent cases on juveniles, however,
decided in the context of the Eighth Amendment, seem to signal
a return to focus on lessened culpability and capacity for
rehabilitation when determining appropriate punishment.183 As
Professor Kristin Henning has written,
The Supreme Court’s recent review of adolescent development
research in Graham v. Florida and Roper v. Simmons suggests that
adjudications in making a future ruling, it is likely social science findings and data
could again come into play.
179 See supra notes 170-81.
180 While this argument is based on the reasoning of Roper, Graham, and
Miller, I am not arguing that the use of juvenile adjudications to increase mandatory
sentences constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation. (For such an argument, see
Beth Caldwell, supra note 157). Rather, the Court’s conception and understanding of
juveniles, as developed in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, sheds light on how the
Court may view adjudications resulting from a system specifically created to
accommodate juveniles as distinct from adults in the area of due process. For a detailed
discussion of such “constitutional borrowing,” see Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai,
Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459 (2010).
181 See, e.g., Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 430 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner,
J., dissenting); Barry C. Feld, supra note 173.
182 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543-45 (1971).
183 See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida,
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
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policymakers may be heading in the wrong direction with juvenile
court policy . . . . [T]he Supreme Court has been seemingly less
reactionary and more attentive to science in its analysis of criminal
justice issues involving children.184

Additionally, the research upon which the Court has
based such decisions “re-affirms the beliefs of the founders of
the juvenile court.”185
Juvenile adjudications are obtained in a system that is
grounded in the purpose and design of accommodating juveniles
as a class distinct from adults.186 This is different from the
purpose of the adult criminal system. Roper, Graham, and Miller
all demonstrate the Supreme Court’s decision that juveniles are
categorically less culpable than adults.187 Essentially, the purpose
of the juvenile system is to account for the differences described in
the Roper line of cases—less culpability, less stigmatization, and
greater opportunity for rehabilitation.188 Therefore, the use of
juvenile adjudications under the Apprendi exception constitutes a
due process violation by equating a juvenile adjudication with an
adult conviction without any consideration of the relative
culpability between the two.189 Under the view currently adopted
by a majority of the courts, a defendant with three prior juvenile
adjudications is automatically considered to be as deserving of
punishment as a defendant with three prior adult convictions.
This result runs afoul of the Roper line of cases. At the time when
the offense was committed, the juvenile defendant was less
culpable than an adult. The passage of time does not now make
him equally culpable.
The Court’s focus on the inappropriateness of equating
the misconduct of juveniles with that of adults tracks from
184 Kristin Henning, Juvenile Justice After Graham v. Florida: Keeping Due
Process, Autonomy, and Paternalism in Balance, 38 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 17, 23 (2012).
185 Id.
186 FELD, supra note 14 at 60.
187 See generally Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455; Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011; Roper, 543
U.S. 551; Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011.
188 FELD, supra note 14 at 60.
189 Although Judge Posner does not focus on relative culpability, he briefly
touches upon a similar argument in his dissenting opinion in Welch, arguing that just
because the juvenile adjudication is constitutionally sound for the purpose of the
juvenile court system does not render it constitutionally sound for all purposes:

The constitutional protections to which juveniles have been held to be
entitled have been designed with a different set of objectives in mind than
just recidivist enhancement. So the mere fact that a juvenile had all the process
he was entitled to doesn’t make his juvenile conviction equivalent, for the
purposes of recidivist enhancements, to adult convictions.
Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 431-32 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting).
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Roper and is developed through Graham and Miller. Roper
focused on the fact that “[f]rom a moral standpoint it would be
misguided to equate the failings of a minor child with those of
an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s
character deficiencies will be reformed.”190 While the Roper
Court discussed the possibility of reform, a possibility that
arguably applies with less persuasion in the case of an adult
defendant with multiple offenses, the Court pointed out that
the two social purposes served by the death penalty in that
case were deterrence and retribution.191 The Court went on to
state that “the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor
as with an adult. Retribution is not proportional if the law’s
most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or
blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by
reason of youth and immaturity.”192
Following Roper, Graham also focused on the diminished
culpability of juveniles.193 The Court directly discussed retribution
as a possible justification for the imposition of a sentence of life
without parole on a non-homicide juvenile offender.194 The Court
stated that while “[r]etribution is a legitimate reason to
punish, . . . ‘[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal
culpability of the criminal offender.’”195 Notably, the Court wrote:
A sentence of life imprisonment without parole . . . cannot be
justified by the goal of rehabilitation. The penalty forswears
altogether the rehabilitative idea. By denying the defendant the
right to reenter the community, the State makes an irrevocable
judgment about that person’s value and place in society. This
judgment is not appropriate in light of a juvenile nonhomicide
offender’s capacity for change and limited moral culpability.196

The Graham Court’s discussion of the “rehabilitative
ideal” is noteworthy because the Roper line of cases, including
Graham itself, deals with juvenile offenders in the adult
system. By discussing the importance of the rehabilitative ideal
in this context, the Court attaches the rehabilitative ideal not
to the system in which the sentence is imposed, but rather to
the age of the person at the time the offense is committed.
190
191
192
193
194
195
196

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).
Id. at 571.
Id. at 570.
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026-27 (2010).
Id. at 2028.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 2029-30.
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Roper and Graham both focused on a type of sentence
being unconstitutional when applied to juveniles. Roper
prohibited the death penalty for all juveniles,197 while Graham
prohibited life without parole for juveniles who did not commit
a homicide offense.198 Miller focused on a type of sentence being
unconstitutional when it was mandatorily applied.199 Even
though the constitutional provision in question in Miller is still
the Eighth Amendment, the constitutional deficiency arises out
of the lack of process afforded the juvenile when life without
parole is mandatorily applied.200 In rendering its decision, the
Miller Court began with the premise that “Roper and Graham
establish that children are constitutionally different from adults
for purposes of sentencing.”201 The Miller Court focused on the
fact that the mandatory process
remov[es] youth from the balance—by subjecting a juvenile to the
same life-without-parole sentence applicable to an adult—[which]
prohibit[s] a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law’s
harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile
offender. That contravenes Graham’s (and also Roper’s) foundational
principle: that imposition of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile
offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children.202

In holding that a mandatory sentence was unconstitutional
when applied to juveniles, the Court recognized that previous cases
held that “a sentence which is not otherwise cruel and unusual
does not becom[e] so simply because it is mandatory.”203 However,
“a sentencing rule permissible for adults may not be so for
children.”204
Likewise, the Apprendi “conviction exception,” as it
currently stands, may be viewed as a sentencing rule that is
permissible for adults with prior adult convictions. It does not
necessarily follow that the same sentencing rule must be
constitutionally sound for adults with prior juvenile adjudications.
The Roper line of cases stressed the lessened culpability of
juveniles while Graham held that the sentencing process itself
must take into account the lessened culpability of youth when
such a severe sentence was imposed.205 These cases recognize
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205

Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (2005).
Graham,130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
Id.
Id. at 2464.
Id. at 2466.
Id. at 2470 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
See supra notes 191-200.
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that the conviction of a juvenile, even within the adult system,
is constitutionally different than the conviction of an adult for
the same offense. Graham specifically held that even though a
punishment may be constitutionally permissible, a sentencing
process that does not take into account the lessened culpability of
the juvenile can create a constitutional violation.206 Such reasoning
implicates the use of juvenile adjudications for sentencing
enhancements. While the sentence itself may be constitutionally
permissible, a process that does not take into account the lessened
culpability of a juvenile is constitutionally deficient.
CONCLUSION
There has long been an argument against using juvenile
adjudications as sentencing enhancements because they were
obtained without a right to a jury trial guarantee.207 Scholars
argue that the language of Apprendi presupposes a jury trial
guarantee in the prior proceeding and, additionally, juvenile
adjudications may not be as reliable as previously assumed.
But there is a second basis on which juvenile adjudications
should not count as convictions for the purpose of sentencing
enhancement—one that stands regardless of whether McKeiver is
overturned. Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in Miller and
Graham focuses on the nature of juveniles as fundamentally
distinct from adults. A juvenile adjudication cannot simply be
equated with an adult criminal conviction. A juvenile adjudication
is obtained within a system that exists precisely to recognize a
categorical distinction between children and adults. Even if such a
system were supported by a jury trial guarantee, counting juvenile
adjudications as convictions falling within the “conviction
exception” of Apprendi violates the constitutionally guaranteed due
process rights of the defendants. The Supreme Court has already
provided the framework for this decision. All that remains now is
for the Court to be presented with the correct set of facts.
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